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Some Observations on the Economic Fram.ewor!.: for Optimum
LDC Utilization of Technology:

Abstract

This paper attempts to explore the relationships between the choice
of technology and the problems of rising unemployment and worsening income
distribution in the developing world.

It is addressed mainly to the issue

of whether or not, given present constraints on technology choice and out•
put mix# developing countries can be reasonably expected to be able to
escape from the straitjacket which seems to force a difficult choice bet·ween
the achievement of output growth, on the one hand, and employment/income
distribution goals, on the other.

Two kinds of evidence are examined in

support of the contrary hypothesis, namely that a more endowment-sensitive
growth path can yield more output, employment and, possibly, a better dis•
tribution of income Bt the same time:

the historical experience of a small

"deviant" sub-family of LDC' s and cross-sectional evidence from a larger

number of country cases.
The paper first an~lyzes the mechanism of technology transfers from
rich to poor, distinguishing between the process of ;:,arrowing from a shelf
of international technology and the domestic technolo&y adaptation process.
Secondly, the changing relative importance of these two processes in a
time•phased historical conteJct is brought out, as the typical labor surplus
developing country moves from import substitution through the export su0•
stitution sub-phase of 3rowth.

The empirical record of historical Japan,

along with that of contemporary Korea and Taiwan, is examined in this con•
text--both at the macro and micro levels.

It is found that technology

sssimilation, especially during the export substitution phase when
relative price signals are comparatively less distorted, can be extremely
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important in terms of both output mix and technology change.

The same. kind

of evidence on technological flexibility seems to emerge when we look across
scales within countries still generally under import substitution po.lie~
but where the impact of such policies varies by size of firm.
The paper points attention to the major specific manifestations of
industrial technological flexibility at the machine and plant level and
briefly discusses the importance of R & D expenditures, government infLa•
structure, educational strategy, and type of private sector organization
as additional dimensions of an adequate economic framework for optimum LDC
technology choice.

Finally, Section IV summarizes the overall findings

of the paper and presents conclusions for policy of relevance to both the
technology borrowing and lending countries.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC FRAMEPOilK FOR OPTIMUM
LDC UTILIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY

Gustav Ranis*
The "proper" use of technology is, of course, not an end in itself.
The growing concern with the subject emanates, instead, from its possible re..
levance to the increasingly serious problems of rising unemployment and wor•
sening income distribution in the less developed world.
dwell at length on the facts before us:

There is no need to

even reasonably "successful 11 countries

i.e. growing at 5 to 6 percent annually in real terms during the 50s and 60s
have been experiencing increasing rates of unemployment and underemployment,, along
with growing disparities in the regional 8nd personal distribution of income.
Non•agricultural sector labor absorption rates, i.e. the ability of the commer•
cialized portions of non-agricultural activity to provide efficient employment
has been low and falling--to the 2 or 3 percent level annually--increasingly
unable consequently to even keep up with the growth in the labor force. • For
manufacturing alone, the developing world as a whole experienced annual rates
of growth of output in excess of 7 percent between
or labor absorption was just about 4 percent.

1

1

55 and

1

65, while the rate

When we view this record of the

past along with tne··existing backlog of underemployment in agriculture, the
likely incapacity of agriculture to be able to "hold" its own increments of
population efficiently, plus the overall labor force explosion

we can safely

anticipate over the next decade and a half--regardless of the extent of success
in curbing fertility--the dimensions of the mounting pressures for labor ab
sorption on the part of the non-agricultural sector are painfully clear.

*Professor of Economics and Director, Economic Growth Center, Yale
University.
1

David Turnham, The Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries,
O.E.C.D. Development Center, Paris, 1971.

The part of taat same historic al record we would like to concent rate
on in the context of this paper is the apparen tly ever-inc reasing capital inten•
sity of LDC's industri .al sectors, taken as a whole, both in terms of output
1
.
.
What is more, unlike in
mi xes and the t echno1ogy emp 1oyed f or given mixes.
agricult ure where most people have increasi ngly come to accept the realism of
alterna tive optimum scale and input combina tion, dependin g on varying endowment
'
conditio ns, the belief continue s to be~idel y held that LDC industry is subject,

in nature, to more or less fixed proporti ons statical ly, and to the march of
ever•inc reasing capital intensit y dynamic ally.

All of which, of course, seems

to support the notion of the inevita bility of a conflic t between output and
employment objectiv es as we look into the future.
Fortuna tely, however, a little thought leads us to the conclusi on that
this conclus ion is unreali stically pessimi stic, at a minimum because we know
that there exist a number of mature technolo gy exportin g countrie s which differ
from each other in the capital intensit y of their latest technolo gy••not to
speak of the possible choice of alternat ive vintages and of the possibi lities
of substitu ting and adapting "on top of" any given set of borrowed technolo gy.

Moreove r, there exis;:s evidence , mainly from a "devian t" subset of develop ing
economi es, which indicate s that the aforeme ntioned generall y dismal LDC record
on output versus employment generati on may be mislead ing if not interpre ted in
its proper historic al perspec tive.

Such evidence of markedly differen tiated

perform ance extends to the nature of the role of industr ial technolo gy change,
includin g at the rr.~.cro ].,.:vel, nnd strongly indicate s that that role is not fixed
in nature but is subject to policy actions, both within and outside of the
develop ing world.
1Though there exists an intimate relation ship between what is happenin g
in agricult ure ancl. industry in the typical LDC, in terms of the supply of wage
goods, industr ial real wage levels, and migratio n patterns , conside rations of
spece force us to concent rate only on the industr ial sector here. We are thus
also slightin g the customa rily large LDC services sector.
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Section II briefly explores the technolog y transfer mechanism, first
in the abstract, then in the context of post-war LDC developme nt experienc e.
Section III presents empirical evidence, from the "deviant" subset of LDC's••
both at the macro and micro levels--co ncerning the potential ly different roles
technolog y transfer can play under different historica l and environme ntal
condition s.

Section IV is concerned with the policy conclusio ns which may be

derived from our analysis.

II.

,I!!! Technolog y Transfer Mechanism

It must be remembered, first of all, that, unlike in the rich countries ,
technolog y change in the developin g world is not an internal quasi~aut omatic
and routinize d process generated through R&D e~cpenditu res allocated according
to some public or private rules of cost-ben efit analysis.

Rather, it is, at

least in the first instance, an act of borrowing from someone else who has al•

ready incurred the costs of trial and error, from conceptio n to laborator y inven•
tion to commercia l innovatio n.

While the Pearson Commission end others referred

to the fact that "only" 2 or 3 percent of the world's R&D is today spent by the

LOO's, I think there is no one who would really recommend that the poor countries
could afford to shut themselve s off from the accumulat ed knowledge of e,dsting
industria l technolog y and start inventing and innovatin g

E!

novo.

LDC expendi•

tures on R&D are, of course, positivel y correlate d with technolog y change but
this does not by itself prove causation nor that they ought to spend more in
1
this direction . Katz, for eirnmple, found that, for Argentina , the rate of growth
1
of industria l output, (a proxy for "learning by doingl ) explained 8lf. percent of

the so•called "residual , 11 P.&D only 6 percent.

It is thus, in the absence of

1
contrary evidence, quite n·atural and appropria te that LDC s spend only .OS to
1
Jorge M. Katz, "Industri al Growth, Royalties Paid Abroad and Local
Expenditu res on Research and Developm ent," Paper presented to IEA Conferenc e
on Latin .American Development, Mexico City, December 1971.
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.5 percent of their GNP on R&D, as contrasted to 5 percent in the case of the
developed countries.

As we shall see below, it is much more relevant to inquire

into the composition of LDC expenditure s on R&D, as between so-called "basic"

and

II

applied" research.
One thing is amply clear, i.e. the very co-existenc e of rich and poor on

the same shrinking globe presents many interdepend encies, advantages as well as
disadvantag es, to the poor countries.

Among these, the existence of an inter•

national technolo8Y shelf which incorporate s all versions and vintages of human
productive e1tperience to date•-both on "how to make" a given commodity, as well
as on 11 ·what to make"•-prob ably represents the sinzle most dominant phenomenon,
at least as far as the LDC 1 s current use of technology is concerned.

1

In examining the nature of the technology flows from rich to poor and in
assessing the contributio n of these flows to the problem of LDC performance with
respect to output, employment, and income distributio n, it is helpful, moreover,
to differentia te clearly between the initial act of borrowing from the shelf and

the subsequent act of domestic adaptation.
Borro'Wing implies taking something off the shelf and attempting to repli~
cate it more or less as is in the recipient country, using essentially the same
processes and combination s of factors.

Theoretica lly, of course, as we have al

ready mentioned, there e;dsts considerabl e choice as to what is borrowed in terms
of from which country and what vintage, but such choices may, in fact, be severely
circumscrib ed either because only a subset is known or because the LDC iLJ other•
wi:se constrained by its o"t-m economic environment and non-economi c preferences
or those of the technology lender.

Thus the 1950 vinta~e U.S. technolo3y may

1Theoretical ly, such a shelf is composed of all possible ways in which
a unit of X can be produced by different countries and at different times. The
most capital-inte nsive choice might, for example, be u.s. 1972 machinery, an
intermediat e choice, Japanese 1972 machinery, and a yet less capital-inte nsive
chof.ce, J.spanese"l9 50 machinery, etc. with virtually an infinite number of
theoretical possibiliti es available. In the real world, as we shall see below,
only a portion of such a shelf may., in fact, be illuminated and an even smaller
portion feasible for borrowing.

-5-

not be considere d "shiny11

'

enough by the recipient ; moreover, it may not be

physicall y available for export, even if the blueprint s could be found and dusted
off; on the other hand, the 1972 vintage Japanese technolog y may not be importabl e
if the recipien t's main trade and/or aid relations are with another advanced
country, etc.

Regardles s of how large the visible shelf and how constrain ed or

unconstra ined the choice, it is this act of technolog ical borrowing which people
usually have in mind when discussin g the technolog y gap and technolog y transfer- 
and which is usually blamed by those who object to the use of "inapprop riate" in•
dustrial technolog y.

1

There is, however, a second important dimension to the technolog y trans
fer mechanism which is usually given much less attention , namely technolog ical
Such assimilat ion basically means the ability to ad•

adaptatio n or assimilat ion.

just borr<>Med technolog y to the often radically different factor endowment situa•

tion by meens of a secondary innovatio nal response.

Since we are discussin g a

process of borrowing from capital rich to capital poor countries , this adapta
tion p.r.o.cess, if it takes place at all, can be expected to be in a labor-usi ng
'i

or capitAl-s aving direction .~

The borrowing and the adaptatio n may, of course,

be going on together, i.e. as part of one entrepren eurial act; in fact, there is

likely to be significa nt interacti on between where the LDC borrows from the shelf
and the potential for further reduction s in the capital-o utput ratio "on top of"
the import.

We will, however, find it useful to maintain a distinctio n between

1It should, moreover, be noted that "picking something off the shelf" may
not be quite as simple as it sounds. A so-called turn-key project, an extreme
version of technolog ical borrowing , may try to duplicate all the inputs in their
familiar combinati ons yet, finding itself in a totally different environme nt,
be forced to operate much more inefficie ntly. The more capital intensive the
import, i.e. the further removed from the total cultural and economic e,:perienc e
of the recipient , the larger the gap between shelf efficienc y and the efficienc y
of the initial transplan t. Such X-ineffic iency is..likely to di.min.ish quasi•
automatic ally with time.
2
II
some of this may be what textbooks call substitut ion," i.e. relativel y
more labor and relativel y less capital for essential ly the same productio n pro
cess, in response to different relative prices. Some may involve reorganiz ations,
which are more in the nature of innovatio ns. We are not concerned here with the
theoretic al niceties of such distinctio ns and will call anything which achieves
a lower capital-o utput ratio (or a higher productiv ity of capital) without sacri•
labor productiv ity, a capital-s aving innovatio n.
£ice of
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these two important types of innovatio nal activity when analyzing optimum LDC
utilizati on of technolog y.
The reason for this, in short, is that the two component processes of
technolog y transfer are likely to play a substanti ally different role, absolutel y
and relative to each other, depending on where a particula r developin g economy
finds itself at a particula r point in its own historica l developme nt.

Most

LDC' s entered what has been called the import substitut ion phase of developme nt
after World War II.

1

This period is character ized by the attempt to restructu re

pre-indep endence or colonial resource flows in the direction of national develop
ment.

Given the customary absence initially of a strong indigenou s entrepren eurial

class, as well as some of the necessary economic and social overheads , the import
substitut ion regime has typically concentra ted on capturing tradition al export
earnings, through exchange controls, and redirectin g them to the construct ion
of overheads in the public sector and the e2rpansion of import-re placing consumer
goods industrie s, either in the public sector or, via import licensing and
tariffs, in the private sector.

At the same time, domestic resources , given

the inflation ary pressures caused by deficit financinc , increasin gly overvalue d
exchange rates, the tight rationing of credit (as well possibly of such other
scarce inputs as cement, steel, etc.), were being redirecte d to the same growing
industria l sector.

The well-know n distortio ns of relative prices resulting from

such governmen t intervent ion in a number of crucial markets helps pull resources
into the hands of the public sector, for social capital construct ion, on the one
hand, and provides larger than normal profits to offset larger than normal
Tisks for the country's fledgling private sector entrepren eurs, on the other.
Specifica lly, import substitut ion policies bias both the initial borrowing
choice (in a capital-in tensive direction ) and reduce to a minimum the volume of
1

Some, e. g, · in-Latin llmerica, substanti ally earlier.
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labor-u sing assimi lation carried on in connec tion with that borrow ing.

The

over-va lued
price of (scarce ) capita l is kept artific ;ially low by a combin ation of
rated
exchang e rates, a differe ntial tariff structu re, low interes t rates, accele
deprec iation allowan ces, etc.; the price of (abunda nt) labor is kept artifi
benefi ts
cially high by minimum wage legisla tion, pressu re in behalf of fringe
social
and higher pay for night work and agains t differe ntials by age and sex,
large
securit y taxes levied on a number of worker s basis, job securit y, plus
severan ce paymen t provisi ons, etc.

With econom ic signals thus severel y distort ed

takes
in favor of the use of capita l, most private sector technol ogy borrow ing
place at the most capital -intens ive or modern end of the shelf.

The public

normal ly
sector is even more likely to select the latest technol ogy since costs
role
play a smaller and prestig e and other institu tional constr aints a larger
here.
Second ly, since where one does one's technol ogy borrow ing, i.e. at what
borrow er,
"distan ce" from the social- cultura l inherit ance and experie nce of the

pro
undoub tedly affects one's ability to adapt, the techno logical assimi lation
of
cess is normal ly held to a minimum during the import substit ution phase
develop ment.

1

Finally ; and most import antly, as long as the policy of heavy protec tion
from both

foreign and domest ic compet ition provide s entrepr eneurs with assured

e their
and large windfa ll profits ; there is little reason for them to exercis
techno logical ingenu ity in any particu lar directi on.
busines smen are prone to

II

It is well known that

satisfi cing" rather than "maxim izing" profits ; the

smaller
differe nce between .50 and 60 percen t annual profit rates just looms much
ment.
than the differe nce between 10 and 20 percen t in a more compet itive environ
Even in India; a large relativ ely domest ically oriente d economy, with
a substa ntial domest ic engine ering and machin ery produc ing capaci ty, only
during
.12 percen t of indust rial technol ogy has been of the indigen ous variety
the import substit ution phase.
1
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are able to sit back anq
Under impo rt subs titut ion the large estab lishe d firms
or perm its, while small or
relax once they have gotte n their licen ses, loans ,
s to resou rces at any price .
new entre prene urs have diffi culty in achie ving acces
s plus normal expe ctatio ns of
Given the afore ment ioned relat ive price disto rtion
anyth ing, risin g relat ive
a conti nuati on of the prese nt envir onme nt with, if
a labor -usin g direc tion.
wage s, there is littl e reaso n to bias techn ology in
tatio n virtu ally absen t,
In shor t, with borro wing capit al-in tensi ve and adap
labor -savi ng, and incre asing ly
LDC indu stria l techn ology is likel y to belhe avily
spite of a large and
so over time, durin g the impo rt subs tituti on phas e--in
grow ing overh ang of idle labor .

Simi larly , the econo my's outpu t mix will, if

direc tion as new indu strie s
anyth ing, be shift ing in a more capit al-in tensi ve
by the conti nuing expo rt
are built and overh eads cons truct ed-•u suall y finan ced
The afore ment ioned heavy veil
of tradi tiona l raw mate rials and prima ry produ cts.
prod ucts, more over, perm its
betwe en mark et and shadow price s of both facto rs and
change in such mi:~ can
littl e change in the outpu t mix via trade . The major
es, as per capit a incom es
take place only throu gh dome stic demand patte rn chang
titut ion-- all of which makes
incre ase with conti nuing consumer goods impo rt subs
sity over time of the
a furth er contr ibuti on to the incre asing capi tal inten
ary, i.e. non-d urabl e consumer
indu stria l secto r. In short , when the end of prim
expe ct the indu stria l secto r
goods , impo rt subs tituti on has been reach ed, we can
ning, both in terms of
to be more capi tal inten sive than it was at the begin
outpu t mix and techn ology .
s the LDC's durin g the
Smal l wond er, there fore, that our first look acros
with respe ct to the probl em
1950 1 s and 60s yield ed such pessi misti c conc lusio ns
g world , espe ciall y Asia
befor e us; for it is a fact that most of the deve lopin
al impo rt subs tituti on
and Afric a, has been engag ed in a more or less typic
while it has become
patte rn durin g that perio d. This patte rn, more over,
a neces sary respo nse to the
fashi onab le to be criti cal of it, may well cons titute
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initial shortage of domestic entrepreneurship and overhead capital.
issue is "how much" and for

11

how long."

1

The real

Once the end of 1'primary" import sub-

stitution has been reached, LDC 1 s usually have at least two choices:

one, with

the help of their now mature entrepreneurial capacity, to move into a more market
and labor-intensive industrial export phase, via a gradual reduction of the
temperature in the industrial "hothouse; 11 two, to t;:-y to avoid the (inevitable}
pains of such a transition

2

by continuing to import substitute in "secondary,"

more capital-intensive areas, e~g~ durable consumer goods, capital goods and the
processing of intermediate g::)Ods··-the entire process continuing to be fuelled
by traditional, as well ;;is newly searched out primary product exports.

Much of

Latin America moved from primary dL:·ect:i.y to secondary import subs ti tut ion after
the 30s:

Africa is largely still in the primary phase; and Asia presents a

mixed picture, as we shall see shortly.
The main conclusion we wish to reach here then, and as emphatically as
possible, is that the generally pessimistic overall nistorical record of LDC' s
with respect to employment and income distribution versus output performance,
including the apparent inability to use labor intensive technology and output
mixes in an efficient fashion, is heavily conditioned by the fact that the vast
majority of the countries under observation has been (and today still is) engaged
either in primary or secondary import substitution.

On the other hand, there are

a few countries which, at the end of their primary import substitution phase,
1
To the extent that import substitution is likely to be a necessary his
in countries which don 1 t have a very strong and diversi
phase--especi3lly
torical
fied natural resources base to count on~--one could, of course, distinguish between
11
good 11 and "bad" forms, e, 6 • the use of tariffs versus quotas. But such a dis
cussion would take us too far afield here" (See the author's "Relative Prices
in Planning for Ecor~omic Development, 11 in ~nternational Comparisons of Prices and
Output. D. J. Daly; editor, NEER, Columbia University Press, 1972.i
~For the groups favored by the direct controls regime, i.e. large scale
industrialists, j_mporters and civil servants whose windfall profits and power
(as well as supplementary incomes) respectively, would be threatened thereby.
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moved on to export substitution, i.e. the fusion of maturing entrepreneurs with
large supplies of unskilled labor to effect a shift of the country's production
and export structure from an essentially land to a labor fuelled basis.

The achievement of this transition permittin;:;:; the economy to function
more flexibly in response to a changing endowment picture, could, of course,
be materially assisted by a change in the predominant public policy packase,
as we shall see, and the role of techr..ology, both in terms of the borro~·1inr; and
adaptation processes, be made to change rather drastically.

Our aim here is not

to "praise" the choice some countries made at the end of their primary import
substitution phase and to ucondemn" that of others.

No two countries are ever

alike in terms of their initial structural conditions, and we recognize that the
socio-political situation is customarily much too complicated for any simple
judgments or prescriptions.

We nevertheless do believe that, in order to

properly assess the sign:tficant:e of the rather negative overall LDC record on
technology choice, an e1camination of the experience of some "deviant" cases,
both at the macro and micro levels, is likely to prove instructive.

We turn to

this no-t·7 and hope at the same time to be able to be responsive to at least some
of the "special case" or non-transferability arguments which are often raised
in this context.

III.

~

Empirical Evidence

We intend to deal only with the contemporary Korean· and Taiwanese cases
(along with some attention to historical Japan)
at the micro level.

in any detail--and that mostly

This is both because macro economic changes in these economies

over time are by now pretty ·well known and because the relationship between the
overall economic environment and changes in the role of technology can best be
documented at the micro level--at least at this stage of our understanding.

The beginning of export substitution signalling the end of the primary
import substitution phase occurred in Taiwan about 1959 and in Korea about four
years later.

With industrial entrepreneurs now sufficiently mature, both societies

shifted to a new policy package, entailing substantial readjustments in the major,
previously distorted,

1
relative prices at about that time.

In both countries

the curbing of government deficits and inflationary pressures permitted markets
hypothetically to res,.1me their normal functions; and devaluation (accompanied
by liberalization of the import regime) plus interest rate reform (i.e. higher,

more uniform, official rates)--as well as other displacements of direct by in
2
direct controls--permitted such markets to function again in practice.
Agriculture and exports were no

longer discriminated against.

The veil

between the economy's resource en1owments and their use was gradually being
lifted and a substantial broadening of the development base achieved by har
nessing a much larger proportion of previously disenfranchised peasants and medium
and small seal~ entrepreneurs to the effort.

Consequently, the generation of

output could be accelerated because of--rather than in spite of--a shift to a
more labor-intensive production and export pattern) both in terms of changes
in technology and output miit.

These, of course, naturally go together in a

more competitive environment.

Successful sales in the international markets for

industrial goods requires the use of a more appropriate, i.e. endowment-sensitive
technology and, in turn, makes it possible to alter the structure of a rapidly
growing total export volume.
T,king the Taiwan case first, the major policy changes, including devalua
tion and interest rate refm:m, followed the end of primary import substitution
1

Any change in direction of an economy, and in the facilitating policy
package, does not) of course, ever occur from one year t.o the next, but is the
result of a rather gradual evolution.
2
This time, however, in contrast to the colonial period, subject to the
government 1 s national-development oriented guidance.
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in 1959.

The results:

in 1952 trad.½~~onal rice and sugar constituted 78 per

cent of export earnings; by 1969 this had shrunk to less than 5 percent; labor
intensive industrial exports, including textiles, wood products and electronics
grew from 5 percent to nearly 70 percent of total exports (themselves growing
at an excess of 30 percent annually) over the same period.

Industrial labor

absorption rates of 3 percent annually during the 1~52-59 (import substitution)
period accelerated to more than 8 percent annually in the (export substitution}
1960s--so that both the relative (from 56 percent in 1953 to 40 percent in 1968},
and even the absolute number of workers in agriculture could be reduced, and the
pool of the underemployed "mopped up"--in spite of substantial population and
labor force growth.

We should, moreover, note that the distribution of income

(as measured by the ratio between the percentage of total income received by
the bottom 20 percent relc:tive to that received by the top 20 percent) also im
proved substantially as between 1953 and 1964---undoubtedly as a consequence of a
substantial increase in the labor share.
respectable 10 percent in

1

1

Taiwan's domestic saving rate, a

52N 1 54 shot up to 35 percent by '67- 1 69 and her growth

rate--with much less foreign capital contributing--rose from 2-3 percent to
7-8 percent annually.
A similar general pattern emerges for the case of Korea.

2

Devaluation

in 1964 and a doubling of interest rates in 1965 laid the basis here for a shift
from import to export substitution accompanied by dramatic changes in output mix
and technology.

Here also labor-intensive industrial exports, including elec

tronics, textiles and footwear, amounting to 15 percent of total exports in
1
oavid Turnham; "Income Distribution--Measurement and Problems, 11 S. I. D.
Conference Paper, Ottawa, May 1971.
2
Differences between the two countries which need not detain us here,
are spelled out in the author's "The Role of the Industrial Sector in Korea's
Transition to Economic Maturity," Korean Economic Planning Board Papers on the
Third Five Year Plan, to be published, Summer 1972.
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35 percent annually--by

1968.

(Small scale manufacturing exports, the most

labor-inte~sive part of the spectrum, moved from 18.6 percent of the total in
in 1963 to 31.4 percent in 1968).

Industrial labor absorption rate by that

time had risen to 7 percent annually and the percentage of the labor force in
agriculture dropped from 68 percent (in 1955) to 51 percent (in- 1968) of the
total, as well as absolutely.

A comparison of the aggregative savings and growth

performance of the economy over the period again supports the finding that a
more endowment and technology sensitive development strategy tends to support
simultaneously both output and employinent objectives.

The domestic saving rate

which had been negative as late as 1958 rose to more than 10 percent by 1967
and the annual growth rate,· a mere

1 1/2 percent during the last half of the

50s, to more than 9 percent over the same period.
The Japanese historical case of overall successful development is too
well known for much comment here.

Suffice it to say that her own import substi•

tution period, beginning with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, was relatively
brief and mild by contemporary standards"

1

By the turn of the century changes

in monetary policy as well as in the ownership of directly productive activities
(from public to private) signalled the beginning of export substitution, accom
panied by a switch from land-based raw silk to labor-based silk yarn exports.
For the industrial sector as a whole we note the effect of the increased impor
tance of labor using technology and output mixes, as reflected in the decline
1

Due to limitations on Japan's tariff autonomy imposed from the outside,
as well as the unavailability of the full arsenal of interventionist tools
perfected in the 1930s"
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in the rate of industrial capital deepening, from 2.8 percent annually during
1892•1900 to 1.7 percent during 1900-1906,

1

In all three cases cited the overall favorable economic performance re
corded was due ~n large part to the different role the technology transfer mech•
anism ·. was capable of assuming in the export substitution phase of development.
Not only was there a chance now for initial borrowing choices (from the shelf)
to become more selective, but--and more importantly--for the associated labor•
using adaptations to assume much larger importance.

In a more market-oriented,

competitive environment, entrepreneurs were now faced with the need to employ
the economic calculus rather than putting their energies into the pursuit of
those little slips of paper which guarantee windfall profits under import sub
stitution, almost regardless of what is produced or how.

Once the changing

resource endowment could be reflected, at least partially, in more realistic
relative price signals (interest rate, exchange rate, inter-sectoral terms of
trade), what amounts to social optimality could be gradually approached in the
course of the technology transfer and adaptation process.
The importance of output mix changes permitting abundant unskilled labor
supplies to be massively exported for the first time in the form of new indus
trial exports can best be (and has been) demonstrated at the aggregative level.
But the considerable, and necessary, companion piece of substantially enhanced
technological flexibility is best demonstrated at the micro level to which we
shall now turn.

In this context we intend to agc:in rely mainly, but not ex

clusively, on examples from the same "deviant" subset of developing countries.
1

A detailed analysis of the aggregative Japanese performance is beyond the
scope of this paper. See, however, the author's "Factor Proportions in Japanese
Economic Development," American Economic Review) September 1957 and "On the
Empirical Relevancy of the Fei-Ranis Model of Economic Development: A Reply,"
(with John C.H. Fei), American Econo~c Review, September 1971.
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Taking the Japanese historical case first, this time, we have evidence

both of considerable selectivity in borrowing, i.e. as between the latest
available Western shelf technology and of a very substantial adaptive innovative
effort.

In cotton spinning, for exam~le, the latest Lancashire spindles were

almost invariably imported while, in weaving, which lent itself to a more de•
centralized cottage industry type of organization, non-automatic looms were

usually preferred.

As the U.S. Tariff Commission put it:

the price of the automatic loom is more than twice that of the
plain loom, which, with the additional expense involved in the
importation from the United States or Great Britain, made the
total outlay too high in a country where the interest charges
on money were relatively much higher than the cost of labor.
Japanese mill managers have, therefore, hitherto preferred to
employ more workers and to forego the more labor-saving but
more expensive machinery, in contrast to the situation in the
United States there the high-priced labor is economized rather
than the-·
.... machinery" 1

.Another account, relating to the production of printed goods, is equally in•
structive:
Recently, a Japanese manufacturer of plain linoleum decided to
undertake the production of printed goods. He dispatched a re•
presentative to the United States to purchase the necessary
equipment. The representative was familiar with the modern
linoleum printing machines, printing several colors at one time
and turning out as much as 15,000 square yards in 9 hours, but
he considered it too expensive a piece of equipment, especially
since his labor was being paid only about 50 cents a day, and so
he sought out, in an American plant, an old hand block printing
outfit. It was not for sale~ Its parts were lying about in a
storeroom of the factory.. Some of them were 40 years old, and
the whole outfit had been discarded 15 years before. But the
Japanese representative purchased it and had it shipped to Japan.
In the immediate outlay of capital he saved money, for he pur•
chased the old equipment at the price of a printing machine or
even below the prices of a new hand outfit, but he installed in
his plant equipment that could only have been disposed of as
junk in the United States~ He started in Japan a new industry
in a stage of technical development that had become obsolete
years before in the older industrial countries. 2
1
The Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade, U.S. Tariff Commission, Govern•
ment Printing Office, Washington, 1921;, p,. 116. The same study reports that a
shipment of imported autnmatic looms which arrived, apparently by mistake,
shortly after the turn of the century, had been found so difficult to operate
that, after removing the batteries and warp-stop motions, they were instead
run as plain looms.
2
John Eo Orcha~d, Japan's Economic Position, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1930,

P• 246.
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Japan clearly did not 1:vish to borrovJ the latest technology, possibly ahead of
her entrepreneuria l and other endowment capacities, if there existed viable
alternatives--e specially if such a choice might inhibit the potential for further
adaptive technology response in a labor using direction.

We thus have evidence

of a good deal of pragmatism in technological borrowing and relatively less
evidence of presti3e-distor ted choices.
Nevertheless, leaning heavily on the results of previous R&D expenditures
in the advanced countries (Le. what Veblen calls taking advantage of being a
late comer) and, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the substantial two way
traffic of Japanese and foreign engineers, most of the technological borrowing
was of the late vintage variety--as it is in today's LDC's.

The really important

areas for technological flexibility thus were (and are) to be found, rather,
in the technological assimilation sphere.
It is perhaps useful in this context to differentiate among three types
of labor-using adaptive technology change:

that relating to the machine proper,

or core activity; that relating to the inter-machine within-plant production
process, or machine-periph eral activity; and that relating to the total produc
tion process, including orGanizational variants by plant and stage of processing,
or plant related activities.
With respect to core or machine-related capital stretching innovations,
the simplest and quantitatively probably most important Japanese example was
the running of imported U.K. and U.S. machinery at rates and speeds substantially
in el{cess of those used a0road.

For example, once the kerosene lamp made night

work possible, spinnin 0 could be done on two, sometimes three, shifts daily,
with but two or three rest days a month.

This meant that the average work

week per machine was two to three times that encountered in the country of
origin; and, since physical depreciation is much less important than economic
obsolescence, using a machine twice as intensively does not wear it out twice
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as fast.

This heavy use of machinery typical of the 19th century Japanese in

dustrial sector meant that the normal gap between the physical and economic
life of a machine was substantially narrowed and capital was considerably
11

stretched. 11
Moreover, there was in evidence a related speed-up of the very same

spinning machines thus permitting substitution between labor and intermediate
input quality.

By running the machines at faster speeds and/or by substituting

cheaper raw materials, i.e¢ raw cotton--and making up for it by increasing the
number of women to handle the resultant increase in the number of broken
threads-•an additional major saving in capital could be achieved:
Certain differences in the industries of the two countries are
import·ant and must be noted. The raw material is essentially
different. Though the Japanese do use some .American raw cotton,
the bulk of their cotton is from India and is of shorter staple,
more likely to breakage•• o and requiring more labor to put it
through the machinery. The yarn spun has much more of the
coarser counts that require more labor••• By adding more labor
it is run somewhat faster than .American practice••• .All of
these factors are in some way related to the cheap labor policy.
They are there because the labor is cheap. 1
Japanese spindles were equipped with a 7/8 inch instead of a •one inch front
roll to accommodate the shorter staple cotton when operated at higher speeds.
For these several reasons, i.e. differences in the yarn count and dif
ferences in the speed of the machine, as well as differences in the number
of shifts, we find that there was a very marked substitution between capital
and labor in the cotton spinning industry.

For example, Orchard reports

that a competent Japanese spinner working on a 20 yarn count operated from
300 to l:.00 spindles, while an American spinner on the same count yarn tended
from 1,020 to 2,682 spindles, that is, between 2 1/2 and almost 7 times as
many.

2

.As the U.S. Tariff Commission reported:
1
John E. Orchard,
2
Ibid., p. 36 7.

.Q.e•

ill•,

p. 367.

In order to distribut e the fixed overhead charges in the way
of high interest and depreciat ion costs, and to earn the large
amounts needed to pay a normal rate of dividend, every effort
has been made to obtain the largest possible output from the
expensive equipment and plant. Machinery is therefore run
at high speed, and almost since their inception the Japanese
spinning mills have been operated night and day, employing
two 12-hour shifts (22 actual working hours) for an average
of 27 days a month$1
Here again, given a standl!rd count of yarn, the average Japanes'e spinner is

seen as. tending 240 spindles, . -whilq: the /unerican counterpa rt on the same machine
tends about 1,000 sp:!..ndle.a..

il..s '.'..atr; as 1932 weekly man-hours per 1 1 000· homo

geneous spindles o·f· the same quality ranged from "328. C in Japan to 164. C in
the United Kingdom and 143.1 in the United States.

2

A somewhat similar story can be told with respect to cotton heaving.

Once again,

the high cost of mill construct ion is considera bly reduced if you
consider the hours during which the mill is being put to effec
tive use" So far in Japan the wheels have turned round during
20 out of 24 hours, llhile in Europe only L hours are being lli01'tte4,
Effective working_.time in-Englan d is less than 3G hours per
week, as 2 hours out of these 3 are devoted to cleaning; this is done
in Japan after working hours.
Again, the U.So Tariff Commission reports that "in weaving staple cotton
sheetings , the ordinary Japanese weaver seldom operates more than two plain
looms, while the American weaver, with perhaps some assistanc e in supplying
114
fresh bobbi.ns, normally tends from 8 to 10 plain looms.

Taking cotton

spinning and weaving together, the U.S. Toriff Commission concluded :
the ave:rage Japanese spinner or weaver tends about one-fourt h
the number of spindles or looms usually assigned to one person
in a~ American mills A compariso n of the total number of
1

1.ne ·:;;::~: Cotton In~1:Ey __anLJ~ , 2£.! £ll:,

2

P• 99.

The World 'f~i!~_?- _llStry: " Economic and Social Problems, Uol. 1,
Internati onal Labour Office, Geneva, 1037, ·p, 209.
3Arnold s, Pearse, JaJF1.£... ~_Ch~, Cotton Industry Report, Inter•
I
national Federatio n of Haster Cotton Spinners and Hanufact urers' Associati on,
Manchest er, 1929, p, [6.
4
1!llLJ.~e.~ ~~e Cotton Industry and Trade, £e.• ill•, P• 100.

persons emi_)loyed in the two countries to operate individual
plants of similar size, and, viewed more broadly, a comparison of
the total number of persons employed in the ~-1hole American
industry, per 1,000 spindles, with the number that would be
required on the similar balanced basis under the Japanese con
ditions, confirms the general relat.ion observed, that the
Japanese mills require between three and yne-hdf and four
times as many operatives as the American~
In the case of silk production, which, togethe1· with cotton, made up
more than 70 percent of total Japanese industrial output about 1900, we . have
similar evidence of the ability to innovate in a capital-stretch ing direction

c,n the machine proper.

In raw silk, for example, the Japenese employed more

than twice as many girls as did the same reeling basins in Italy.

0uite early

in the game it is reported that a !'modified technolosi' in silk yielded a
capital-lllbor ratio of 026, a capital-output ratio of 1.45, as compared with

l. 06 and 4, 22 respectively for the "unadjusted" laree- scale technology.

2

Turning to machine peripheral activities, much of the inter-machine

handling and transporti.ng is dor.e by
conveyor belts were devised...

hand

In place of mechanical, human

Receiving> packaging and storing was done by haQd,

The same was ttue for the handling of intermediate inputs required, e.g., as
Orchard again rep(~•~tr ·
at one of th~ l~r~es~ copper s~elts~c in Japan, clay for
the linirg of the furnaces is carried down irom a nearby hill
side on the backs of women. At the plant of the Tokyo Gas
CompanyJ coke is put into kegs by hand and then carried by
coolies, some of them women, to the barses in the adjacent
canal. Coal, even in the larger Tokyo plants, is unloaded
by hand a·.1d carried in baskets to the power houses. 3

In sum, the quantitative importance of this ability to substitute labor for
capital in activities peripheral to the machine proper was apparently quite sub•
stantial.

Very often such activities ·Ne.::e machine paced in the Hirschman sense,

i.e. while they might have looked wastefuJ co the untrained Western eye, they
were, in fact, paced by well- spaced machinery as part of the same production

line which contained large numbers of unskilled laborers.

--------- --·
1

2

I ~ . , P• 113.

Katsuo OtsukaJ ''Technical Choice and Technical Progress in the Silk In
dustry," unpublished Hitotsubashi University seminar paper.
3
Ibid, , p, 255,.

-20A third type of adaptive technology change of ,·ihich much use was made

in historical Japan is of what we have called the plant-related variety.

This

is often characterized by the co-existence of different historical staees of
production in the same industry.
present outstanding e~rnmples.

Raw silk production and cotton weaving re

In the former industry silkworm rearing and

cotton production were handled mainly by farmers' wives in small home-made
sheds, extensions of the rural households.

In

cotton weaving, most of the

yarn was "put out" to farm households, with individual looms dispersed in farm
houses and work.sheds.

But even in the more modern factory-style spinning indus•

try, preparatory and finishing processes vJere carried out largely at the cottage
level.
This rather

remarkable survival of domestic industry on a subcontrac•

ting basis must be explained lr:rgely in terms of the e,~ploitation of complemen•
tarities between many small labor-intensive operating units and the large industrial·manage ment units.

The traditional merchant middleman, as a representa•

tive of the sub-contracting unit, served as both supplier and market for the
goods to be worked up domestically.

A specialization of functions as between

workshops, even as bet,·Jeen the members of a given family, developed.

One-roof

economies could be achieved in this fashion, i.e. by using cheap labor in
cooperation with old- fashioned machinery at the workshop level, while
economies of scale could be achieved in the financing, purchasing and merchan•
dising stages.

1

The continued relative importance of this household type of

enterprise is quite remarkable; cottage style industry contributed more than 2/3
of industrial output in 187C, almost 60 percent in 1GS5, and retained substan
tial importance well into the twentieth century.

Not only lacquerware, pottery,

111 Sometimes even a single part is not completed in one shop or home
but is shaped in one and painted or plated in another.ii H. G. Aubrey, "Small
Industry in Economic Development," ~;ocial Research, September 1951.
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porcelain, sake, fruit and fish canning but also such new consumer goods
coming to the fore over time as bicycles, electric lamps and rubber, were to
exhibit the same characteristics.
Plant amounts to more than 50 percent of total investment in plant and
equipment in most countries.

The ability to utilize households for putting

out operations and thus reduce expenditures on plant undoubtedly amounted to
a major kind of capital stretching innovation.

By deploying familiar but

improving machinery over large numbers of scattered mini-plants, large amounts
of unskilled labor could be deployed in both direct production and in satisfying
the resulting increased demand for transportation and handling activities.
In this fashion, Japanese entrepreneurs were able to, first, incorporate
pure labor services and, later, domestic ingenuity and skills, into their
industrial production and export bundle.
The Japanese thus combined some discrimination in the process of tech•
nology borrowing with a very substantial amount of technology assimilation.
The latter capacity seems to be substantially assisted not only by the relatively
free access to resources by dispersed decision making units, at relatively
realistic prices, but also by the ability to train up the required additional
supervisory personnel through both within-plant training and less formal
learning by doing processes.

At least in textiles, the need for a continuous

supply of what might be called an adaptive engineering; capacity was supplied by
the establishment of applied engineering schools throu3h the pooled efforts of
a number of textile firms.

1

Turning next to the contemporary Korean case et the micro level, there
seems to be less evidence of much conscious rejection of the latest shelf
1
Gary Saxonhouse, unpublished Yale Ph.D~ Dissertation, 1971.

-22technology, al though a good deal of thought ,ms apparently given, subject to
existing aid and other constraints, to the choice betueen late model Japanese,
German and U.S. machinery.

Hhen it comes to capital stretching assimilation,

however, examples abound, especially in textiles, electronics and plywood
production.

1 With respect to the manufacture of silk, for example, the core

activity contrasts a ratio of one girl per two looms ,'1ith one girl per 6.2
equivalent looms in contemporary Japan,
Japan, Korea is tddns; ove:r

ti:12

In reaction to now rising wages in

lower quality yarn spectrum where more girls

can be employed to make up fo:r the inferio,.· quality of thr

raw material.

In

cotton weaving, one Ko:tem1 1_sirl mans 3 looms a8 contrc:sted with l+ in Japa;t;

in spinning the contrast is between 600 .:md SOO spindles.

Moreover, Korean

machinery is run for 3 eight.. hom: shifts daily £is contrasted with only 2 such
shifts in Japan,

Peripheral to t:he machines prope:r,

,1e may note that the

contemporary Japanese use of a conveyor belt system; for example between the
cardine;, gilling and combin3 operations, is repla.::ed by hum~n hands in Korea.
In the production of plywood what at first appears as production pro•
cesses very similar to those carried on in the U.S.; ioe. fixed proportions,
in fact, turn out to be quite flexible--inter estingly enough mainly because of
the greater machine speed combined with much more labor-intensive repair methods
used.

In the United States, defective pieces.of lumber are cut out automatically

by machine and discarded,

In Japan, defective pieces of lumber are cut out by

hand and the section is discarded.

In Korea, defective sections are cut out by

hand, the scraps saved, and the defect plugged manually,

Here once again a

lower quality raw material can be upgraded to an ec:uivalent quality output
through the application of cheap laboro

Consequently, overall we found twice

as many workers per unit of capital equipment in I(orea, i. e, 123 workers are
engaged per equivc!lent capital production line as contrasted with 72 in Japan;
1
The help ,d th Koxean pJ ant in":".erviews of Professor Sung Hwan Cho of
Sogang University, Seoul ia gratefully acknowledged.
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moreover, a Korean line is worked a 22-hour day as compared to 20 in Japan.
At the same time between 10 and 15 percent more workers are engaged in inspec
tion, repair and maintenance of both materials in process and the machinery
in place.
In electronics , machine-rel ated or core-type adaptations are most
prominent.

In transistor assembly operations, for instance, given wage rates

10 times lower than what equivalent operators get in the U.S. (in the same
firm), the machinery is run at physical full capacity, i.e. six days, three
shifts a day which is 20 percent above the U.S. equivalent.

Moreover, certain

special operations such as feeding and packaging are usually done by hand
on the assembly line, instead of automatical ly.

In spite of the greater use

of labor, productivit y per 'l:Jo:rker seems to be higher due partly to the faster
learning process (it was repeatedly stated to take at least two weeks less to
train Korean girls in assembly than llmericans) but mainly to the greater dis
cipline and attentivene ss on the assembly line throughout.

For example in one

firm the difference in speed of assembly on identical equipment yields a
30 percent differentia l in output (from 68 units per machine hour to 05)
and in a die mounting processs it rises to more than 100 percent (from 113
units per hour to 2l:.0).

These greater speeds

o{

operation, either due to

faster machine or operator pacing, are once again accompanied by putting addi
tional girls into more intensive testing, inspection and repair efforts than
is encountered in Japan or the U.So
repaired by hand.

Defective pieces are not thrown away but

Similarly, with machinery itself working at physical foll

capacity, considerabl y more manpower is allocated to the maintenance and
repair of the in-pl ace capital equipment.
With respect to other, plant-relate d technologic al assimilatio n, the
most important phenomenon clearly resides in the area of subcontract ini, both
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domestically, a~d internationally.

Domestically, subcontracting to local equip

ment and parts manufacturers is being increasingly practiced, especially in
the electronics industry; sometimes, as the experience of several companies
indicates, it takes t,·Jo to three years before the domestic subcontracting supplier,
via a learning by doing process, has become a lower cost producer than the main
plant or import alternatives.

While such capital saving innovations, mainly

via the reduction of plant and large-scale urban overhead requirements, are
not yet as \Jide- spread in Korec:i as in historical Japan (and contemporary
Taiwan), they are markedly on the increase in a number of other industries as
well.

Internationally, of course, nccepting a sub-contract for the labor

intensive phase of a multi-str:ge and elsewhere technologically demanding pro
duction process, is a potentially very efficient \,ay of harnessing virtually
pure labor services to the development process.

Bonded export processing

schemes, consisting of tariff free zones into i:-ihich often under subsidiary or
subcontracting arrangements ,·1i th Japanese or American firms, raw materials are
imported and then reexported after value in the form of cheap labor
added, have proven to be most helpful in this context.

bas been

Such arrangements

now yield more than 20 percent of a Korean export volume which itself, as we
have noted above,

has been rising at annual rates of

between 30 and 40

percent during the past few years.
Firm interviews in Taiwan yielded evidence that, assisted substantially
by the establishment of tti~ Kachstung Export Processing Zone, a similar type
of technology assimilation process has taken place, mainly in assembly and
fabrication processing stages.

For example) in a large plastic factory plant,

t·1hile the continuous process (producing resin for PVC p lc:istics) showed about
the same capital- labor ratio as parent company plants in the U. s., the ratio in
1
fabricatins was only about one half of the American plants.
1The help with Taiwan plant interviews of Professor N. R. Chen of Cornell
University is eratefully acknowledged.
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The use of labor is most intensive in electronics assembly.

While

parts are mainly assembled with the aid of machines in the United States,
this work is performed by women 'tvorkers in Tahwn.

According to the general

manager of one major electronics firm, the amount of labor used in assembling
one set of television in the Tniwan plant is 50 percent greater than that in
a plant of the parent company in the United States.

In fact, most of the

electronics firms interviewed were making efforts in one Hay or another to in
troduce labor-intensive methods.

While the capital-labor ratios in this industry)

like most, have been rising globally through time, the largest electronics
factory in Taiwan has e::~perienced an increase of capital by nine times and an
increase of employment by sixteen times between E\:,5 and 1969.

Throughout the

electronics industry, capital-labor ratios have appc1rently fallen during the
60s.

One further conclusion derived from

the Taiwan plant visit~ and con

firmed elsewhere, is thc:t the closer the production process is to th~ raH
material processing stage, i.e. backward linkages, the smaller the chances for
capital stretching types of adaptive technological change;

the closer the pro

cess to the finished product stage, the greater are these possibilities.
It is sometimes asserted that the experience of Japan, Korea and TaiHan
is so atypical, for reasons of size, as well as special cultural, educational
and geographic features, that it is not relevant for LDC 1 s generally.

He do

not wish to dispute the basic point, i.e. that large countries, like India and
Brazil, clearly face a some·uhat different problem in terms of their much smaller
possible reliance on trade to help achieve major changes in output mi:l;: and
associated changes in technology.

Every LDC is clearly different in many other

essential dimensions as well, such as its human versus natural resource endow-

ment, its political structure and the stage of development it has already

-26reached--in cluding here the afore1nentio ned choice it may have already made
(possibly difficult to reverse) as to where tc head at the end of primary

import substitution ,

1

Nevertheles s, at a minimum the evidence collected to

1
date casts serious doubt on the supposed tyranny of the LDC s use of technology

and seriously underestima" i:es the potential inventivene ss of indigenous QUtrepre
re~n:;ar:iP if the e(:onomic environment can be changed"
To make this point and at the same time to at least partially respond
to the adherents of the

II

specia1 case"

po3ition, let us, therefore, before

concluding this section, cite a few relevant examples from other countries.
Unfortunate ly r.ot many have es yet adopted

the full poJ.icy package associated

with ezport substitutio n, most conducive to yielding the kind of evidence we
are after.But several have undertaLen partial changes in their environment
associated ,-ii th lJartial evidence of technologi-::: al flexibility which is believed
to be instructive and will be briefly referred to.
One such e;{arop le is provided by T· 1est Pakistan, an area no one wi 11
confuse with Korea or Taiwan, during the first decade of the 60s.

After

following a more or less classical set of import substitution policies--'\·J ith
more or less classical consequence s in performance --Fest Pakistan moved tO't\lards
a more outward looking environment , including through a de facto devaluation ,
import liberalizati on, and adjustment (in favm: of agriculture ) of the internal
terms of trade around J.S60.

.As a consequence , at the aggregative level, the

saving rate rose from 5~5 percent in J958 to 9 ~ercent in 1966, the grov1th
rate from

L 2 percent to JJ;. pe:rcent :1rd thP g'..owth rate of exports from

2. 5 percent to S, 3 percent,

No:ce imf ortant:i.?

:1a

a consequeuc1::. of the, ad-

mittedly only partial (relative to Korea and To:iwan) move to export substitutio n,

----------·-

1The ::1uthor, in fact) l1elieves that a typological approach (i.e. a
different frame'Work···. of analysis fo:." differ.=:nt ::-...DC sub- families) is necessary,
and a good deal of the work 0£ ·::he Yale ,;;:-ow::h Center reflects this viei-1.
The subject ic again, hm-leve:c, too broad to b~ tackled here,
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non-traditional exports rose by 89 percent bstween 1)5S and 1964 and accounted
for 60 percent of the tot&l in 1964 (cornpar-ed to less than 10 percent in the

1950 1 s).

This restructuring m1s materially aided by whac:_

to most observers,

was a surprising growth of enginee:cj_ng and othe~:· small- scale industries,
especially in the Pt.:;nj abo

At least according to one study, this growth was also

associated with a good deal of adaptive technological change, especially in the
construction of local tube.,weL.s, pumps and other lignt ensineering products.

1

Another example is Kenya, a much smaller and thus, from the beginning,
more open economy in v1hich a subs·;antial amount of technological flexibility
seems to be in evidence, both at ·::he i:.iorrowing level, i.e. through the use of
old equipment, and at the assimUation 1evel 1 especially in a variety of machine-

2 -~
. . ·.
. h era 1 act1.v1.ciss.
,t:;ven
perip

in India, v1hich has cmly recently, and with con•

siderable hesitation, moved in the dire,~tion of liberalization, evidence of
capital-stretch ing can be found,

0za·:.1a, fc;:- exami)le_, reports that a Japanese

glass company operatln2, an Indian subsidi!:lry was able to cut plant size in half
and triple the num!,er of ,.ior:"ers (relative ;:o Japan) because

11

sheet glass is

manually cut, the transport of raw maLeda~s within the plaD.t and the crushing
113
of coal are not au':omated but performed Ly labor,

Finally the experience of the Mexican Export Processing Zone 1 specializing

to date

mainly in elec-;:ro,:iics assembly_, and textiles is :relevant.

While Mexican

industry generally is still living under hot-house import substitution condi
tions, the Northern Border Industries (about 300 UoS. subsidiaries and 150

1Edward H. Smith; '£!.§Rs for 2,.( Technol~, Choice of Techniques and
Economic Growth; Yale Fh,D, Disse:rtaLior. iL p:;:-03:cess" In spite of what has
happened in, and t0, l?slds-::an s:'.ncE.; lar.ge:y as a sonsec1u.enc;e of political de
cisions, the experience oi t~e early 60a !emaiDs valid fo:c our purposes.
• ., 11
2
.
-, 1oyme11t 1n
.• 1',rop
.
d et ai· •Ls: see --dov;ar<l- f-, :.,::;,:,
'
l~eny an Manul.,:; Gcturing,
For f urti1e·c
Yale Economic Growth •-:!enter i:>ciper, January ~:_ S'72..,
3
Terutomo OzawA: nR,,'port on Japan s :c:c::1nsf,:,r of 'l'echnology to Developing
Countries,1' UNIT1iR_. mimeo, Angust 1070.

Mexican firms) have been facing a slightly less distorted set of price signals
and perhaps more importantly> pressures to be competitive in the U. s. market.
Plant interviews here clearly indicate that what is occurring is an early and as
story.

Korea--Taiwnn

yet incomplete version of the

U,S. multi-national cor-

poration subsidiaries, for example, are normally established with the single
purpose of taking advantage of the relatively lm1 Me~dcan wage rate,

1

't'1ith

little initial technology change contemplated--in fact, resistance from head
quarters to tampering with the coefficients lest the quality of output_. be zdversely
affected.

P.,fter a year or so (6 to L months in Korea/Taiwan) local managers

often perceive additional w&ys of rPducing costs by using the imported
machinery more intensively"

This takes the form of a more continuous use of

the machinery includinz multiple shifting ,md let tine; machines remain in place
much longer than in the U.S.

2

This in turn is compensated for, on the one

hand, by much more attention being paid to repair and maintenance activities,
including the replacin::; and adjustinr; of machine tooJs in the local machine
shops.

3

Local subcontracting; though still constrained by the absence to date

of much ancillary

indust:;:i.sl activity near the border and high transportation

costs elsewhere, also increases with time 1 especially ,-:ith respect to packaging
materials, wire and other simple components,

4

The Mexican Border Program illustrates in an even more extreme form than
Korea and Taiwan (due to the more extreme proximity factors, at least as far

as the U.S. is concerned) the growing possibilities of an international system
of subcontracting by process, in accordance with differential factor endovllllents;

1

As well as Section 807 of the U.S. Tariff Code which exempts all but
value added abroad from U.S,. duties.
2

occasionally machines no longer used in the U,, S., Ere exported to the sub•
sidiaries.
3

As an aside, it is interesting to note that r-1e}dco earns more than
$2 1/2 million annually from the repair of Uo S" office machinery, T. V. and radio

sets.
!.:-

The cost effectiveness of such procurement: including savings in transportation, has to overcome the loss of the Uo s. tariff ,·Jcdver on U. s. components.
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this extension of the division of labor by commodity principle provides a larger

scope for adaptive LDC technology.

Japanese synthethic textile firms, for

example, do their material purchasing centrally, let the dying and weaving be
done in Taiwan, the yarn knitted in Hong Kong, and then handle the exports to
the U. s. centrally.

The leather for a U. s. baseball glove manufacturer is

tanned in Japan, the stitching done in Korea.

Both Ford and G.M. are currently

considering the construction of a S01,1th-East 1\sian car, with different processes
to be located in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
Philips

and Volkswagen have, for some time, been e;:perimenting in this field

of the international division of processes which, eiven the close association
between output mix and technology, tends -to give further major scope to indi
genous technological assimilation.
Dynamically, ,-]e may note, e.g. for the U. s. and Japanese electronic firms
operating in Korea and TahJan, a tend~ncy to rno·;;e, over time, from simple
assembly operations to adding process~ng stages both forward and backward as
local skills improve, for example, from transistor assembly to cuttine; the
silicon wafers and precision welding, on the one hand, to the final finishing
processes on the other.

Another tendency which can be detected within

any one

export processing zone, as well as looking across zones of different maturity,
is the inclination to transfer rel~tively low volume series or processes first,
i.e. where economies of scale play

~

lesser role, as well as to keep the number

of style or model variants to a minimum•-and later, as changing capacity permits,
to gradually expand in both directions.
The amount of spatial

flexibility multi-national corporations have shown

in moving their processes about on a globnl scale is also quite remarkable.
The

u. s.,

Japan and Hong Kong, for e;rnmp le have reacted to sustained Japanese

wage increases in recent years by ooving textile, 1-1ig, leather products,
electronics and plastic footwear op,Erations t0 Koren and Taiwan.

Similarly,
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Singapore has lost its unskilled labor-inten sive processes and acquired more
skilled labor-inten sive ones.

Such flexibility includes changes in the selec-

tion of commodities and processes relevant to particular commodities at a

fairly disaggregat ed SITC level.
As we have pointed out repeatedly, the vast majority of contemporar y
LDC 1 s still find themselves in the grip of an import substitution policy regime-
Since

some for good, some not so r.;ood reasons.

v!e

expect a more endm,1ment

sensitive type of environment to be a necessary (if not sufficient) condition
for the demonstrati on of the flexible use of technology, as part of the profit
maximizin3 calculus of dispersed decision making units, we are somewhat handi•

•

;1

•

1\

capped in our effort to marshal! yet additional deviant country evidence.
There remains, however, one other area of investigatio n, which--whil e we can
only touch upon it briefty--pro vides some additional empirical support for the
arguments of this paper.

And that is cross-sectio nal evidence within the indus

trial sectors of given countries, by scale of establishme nt.
It is well knoun that in countries subject to the usual distortions of
import substitutio n, such distortions fall unevenly on large and small firms.
A low interest rate policy, for

example, usually means that large scale firms,

as prime borrowers, get 1the tightly rationed credit at official rates, while
medium and small scale firms do not, and have to either do without or borrow at
substantial ly higher rates.

The same holds for imports, usually available at

official exchange rates to the large well-est:abl ished firms who get their import
licenses, but available only at higher prices) after resale,
medium firms.

to the small and

With respect to labor.i it is the large firms who feel they must

(and can afford to) pay the highest wages, ivhile other scales \vill be content
to stick to the legd minimum or even evade the legislation altogether.

Since

a distortion of rel~tive prices, in other words, implies a direct rationing

-31system, the small and medium scale firms who have to work their way around that
system usually, in sum, face a set of signals closer to equilibrium values.

If

we should then be able to uncover diffferenti al behavior in terms of technology
choice by scale of industry within the same country, our argument is further
strengthened ~
As it turns out, the phenomenon of so-called "industrial dualism" which
we are now talking about--inclu ding as one of its manifestati ons the expected
differentia l use of technology- -has been documented for a substantial number
.

o f countries.

1

The results almost invariably indicate that the medium and small

scale firms are substantial ly more "efficient" in terms of the intensive use

of scarce capital and the e:ctensive use of abundant labor, as reflected in lower
2
Many of the same studies show, either
capital-out put and capital-lab or ratios.
directly or by implication , that real industrial economies of scale (as opposed
to those caused by unequal access to resources) are often exaggerated --at least
in industries in which continuous processes are not dominant.

Not only are

medium and small scale firms thus facing a more competitive environment and
forced to make a more careful, ioe. endowment- sensitive, technology choice
statically

3 but the incentive to innovate and adapt in a labor-using direction

1e.g. for Pakistan in Gustav Ranis, "Production Functions, Market Imper
fections and Economic Developmen t," Economic Journal, June 1962; for Mexico in
Saul Trejo, "Industrial ization and Employment Growth: Mexico 1950-1965," unpub
lished Yale Ph.D. Dissertatio n, 1971; for Colombia in Albert Berry, "The Relevance
and Prospects of Small Scale Industry in Colombia," Yale Economic Growth Center, ·
mimeo, October 1971 and John Todd, "Size of Firm and Efficiency in Colombian
Manufacturi ng," Research Memorandum 41, Center for Development Economics, Williams
College, October 1971; as well as for other countries, in the U.N.'s Industry and
Productivit y, annuals.,
2A similar phenomenon, incidentall y, has been found to hold for LDC agri
culture, i.e. a more intensive use of land on medium and small scale plots,
e.g. in India, Brazil, Colombia and Pakistan.
3For example, Ge K. Boon found that of 88 metalchippi ng (core) processes
used in a cross section of rich and poor countries, almost 50 percent were
sensitive to relative price conditions as well as lot size, ("Optimal Technology
in Metal-chipp ing Machine Tools," May 1968, Stanford University; see also his
Choice of Technique~, El Colegio de Mexico, forthcoming ).
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dynamically is equally enhancedo-

In short, cross sectional evidence, by scale

of operation, within countries still under import substitution tends to further
support the basic notion that changes in the economic environment are essential
for an approach to the optimum LDC utilization of technology.

IV.

.£2.~clusio~~

12E.

Policy

Some of the major conclusions flowing from our analysis may now be
briefly summarized:
1.

There exists only a limited scope for LDC cho~ce in technological borrowing.
The choice of from wh01T to borrow and what vinUige seems to be narro,·1ly

,

·constrained, both by a lack of information, by prestige factors, and by in•
stitutional impedimen~s attending the transfer of capital.

On the other

hand, there exists very substantial scope for technological assimilation,
i.e. indigenous innovations of a labor-using varietyo
2.

The potential for adaptive technology change today seems to be most pro.
nounced in core and machine-peripheral activities, as ,vell as, if to a lesser
extent, in plant.. related activitieso

In the course of such innovations,

most often unskilled labor is substituted for machinery, but sometimes also
for the quality of the raw material inpute

2

The types of

goods subject

to such flexible use of technology include te:~tiles, electronics, metal
working, non-electrical machinery; food processing, tires, tubes, leather

111oreover, the Galenson-Leibenstein type of argument to the effect that
larger wage bills today will yield lower employment tomorrow--due to the lower
savings and capital accumulation entailed~-have not been standing up too well
to empirical tests, Small farmers and industrialists seem to be among the
highest savers (see also a number of U.N. studies on the sources of savings as
well as G. Ranis, "Investment Criteria, Productivity and Economic Development:
An Empirical Comment," ~terlv Journal of Economics, May, 1962~)
2
For example 1 in addition t.o the already cited substitution of short for
long staple cotton in Japanese spinning, Baranson finds similar examples in the
pulp and paper industry, i- e, the blending of short and long fiber pulps, and
even in petroleum refining, ·,,1here domestic crude mixed with imported renders
the use of a smaller scale plant efficient.
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products, rubber and plastic .footwear, wood and wood working, among others.
The ability to adapt seems to be related directly to the importance of pro
duction costs relative to the total sales price, and indirectly to the im
1
portance of quality over price consideratio ns in marketing.
3. · Changes in adaptive technology and in output mixes using such technology
require a set of relati\,e factor and commodity prices which are more sensitive to endowment and endowment changes.

This can be best observed by con

trasting the relevant behavior of industrial sectors over time (as they
move from import substituti.o n to export substitution ) as well as, to some
extent, by looking across industry scales within a country.

More realistic

relative prices appear to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for
softening or eliminating the LDC conflict between output and employment
cum income distributio n objectives,
4.

11
The ability to quickly convert relatively "raw unskilled labor into an

efficient disciplined industrial work force seems to be borne out by all
the evidence.

In fact; not only ahard working11 Korean and Taiwanese girls

but Mexican as well apparently exhibit superior labor productivit y charac
teristics when compared to their U.So counterpart s in exactly the same
operations.

2

One constraint which does apparently inhibit fuller resort

to labor using adaptations ) however, is the scarcity of skilled supervisory
personnel, e., g. for nlght shifts, as well as of a problem solving type of
adaptive engineering capacity.
1

see W. A. Yeoman, /'Selection of Production Processes for the Manufacturi ng
Subsidiarie s of U.S.-based Multi.. National Companies," unpublished D.B.A. Thesis,
Harvard Business School, 1%8, as quoted in Raymond Vernon, "U.S. Enterprise in
Less Developed Countries, 11 in The Gl!R Between Rich and Poor Countries, Gustav
Ranis, editor, MacMillan, 1972.
2
For example, the Electronics Control Corporation reports that one girl
in its Matamoros, Mexico plant produces 3500 units per day on the same equipment
which yields only 2500 units per day in its Eulers, Texas plant. Less chatting,
fewer coffee breaks, and the ever~presen t threat of the ''reserve army" outside
are the usual explanation s offered. (Business Week, January 1972).
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Adaptive research and development--usually carried on within the machine
shops of LDC plants and focusing on endowin8 machines with a larger pro
ductive life through heavy maintenance, as well as the insertion of small,
labor using devices and adjustments-- seems to have had the highest pay-off.
Basic research, carried on mainly within LDC universities and government
institutes, on the other hand, seems to have had a much smaller pay-off.
Our interview evidence thus supports the findings of Katz to the effect
that

II

the 'learnin:c:;1 of the decade of the 60s has been associated with the

presence of a significant local technological effort, more than with the
permanent reception of k.1m1ledge from abroad, additional to that received
at the beginning of operations. 111
6.

Export processing zones have apparently served as effective transitional
devices for countries rnovin3: from import substitution to export substitution.
Export processing permits general organizational and technical talents to
be imported~- along ,·Ji th capital and intermediate G;Oods--while domestic
entrepreneurial maturation is still going on in most of the economy.

Then,

as value is added in the form of mainly unskilled labor before re-export,
adaptive domestic engineering ingenuity plays an increasingly important role
in both cost reductions for a given operation, as well as the adding of
processes and the broadening of the output (or raodels) mix.

Some of this

techaological "learnin3 by experimenting" then seems to spill over to the
rest of the economy--reversing the usual historical notion that one had
to "cut one's teeth;r on the domestic market before being able to e,:port
competitively.

7.

Multi-national corporcitions seem to play a large, though by no means ex
clusive, role in this ne,·1 process-- focused international division of labor,
1

Jorge M. Katz, 2.£• _ill., Pc 24.
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including the utilization of tariff free export processing zones.

This is

probably in large part due to the fsct that such companies have more global
information and control of specific marketso

This is especially relevant

since markets for intermediate goods are substantially less well organized
than those for primary goods, on the one hand, and finished goods, on the other.
These conclusions lead one, in turn, to a number of suggestions with
respect to the policy setting, both on the part of the technology borrowing and
lending countries, most likely to result in improved LDC utilization of technology.
TEking, first, policies within the control of the technology borrowing LDC's:

1.

Technology change cannot be harnessed effectively to the simultaneous solu•
tion of the output generation/employment/income redistribution problem if
macro-economic policies continue to seriously distort major relative price
relationships in both factor and output markets.

All the policies which

render capital artifl.cially cheap and labor artificially expensive--as well
as many policies which distort the relationship among output prices (e.g.
price controls on some consumer goods, subsidies on some capital goods,
and exchange rates ,vhich discr:i.minate agDinst exports)-~all have the effect
of seriously inhibiting the search for labor-intensive technologies and
output mixesff

Neglect of marked improvements in this general environment,

while moving on to

11

direct actions" in inducing a more appropriate use of

technology, will not work--certainly not with respect to the private sector.

Any substantial move towards a better use of technology requires facing up
to the sometimes politically difficult decisions involving at least gradual
liberalization at the end of the primary import substitution phase.

It is,

moreover, important. that any such policy trend, even if slow, be consistent.
Frequent back-and-forth oscillations between a more control and a more
market-oriented environment cause too much uncertainty and probably yield
the worst results.

Capital intensive technology choices may ·well
dustries:

1

labor intensive in others.

11

dorainate" in certairi

But unless the

II

in

game" is made

fairer, ne,v medium and small scale entrepreneurs without previous access
to resources cannot brins their technological inGenuity to bear.

2

A fiscal'

system which artifici&lly subsidizes cottage industry (e.g. India's khadi),

•

is as .wasteful as one which subsidizes high technology industry (vfrtually
every LDC); neither path is likely to encourage the use of modern but
labor intensive technology.
2.

With respect to the public sector, the pressures of domestic competition
and trade, of course, operate less forcefully since many public enter•
prises can afford to run continuous deficits "in the common good" and
much of their output is in non-traded commodities.

Nevertheless the use of

shadow pricing ,;,Jould be very helpful here, especially when relative market
price signals continue to be distorted,.

Huch c&n oe done, for example,

in road construction and public housing, botb of
wide range of technology choice,

3

'i:1bich

offer a relatively

But realisticdly, a major problem to

be overcome, even in the rare case when the public sector does use social
rate of return calculations, is that such calculations are often employed

1

This point is made by Pack and Todaro, among others.
2
We are not suggesting that a fair game means ec:uilibrium prices, e.g. that
real wages could or should be brought down to their shadow price levels--}lor
that most LDC 1 s have the administrative capacity to effectively subsidize the
wage bill--only that real wages should not be allo,-1ed to rise very much as
long as a labor surplus pers:1.sts and real interest rates should not fall as
long as there is an excess demand for credit.
3
Even the Soviets, especially in the production of light machinery and
engineering goods, seem to have successfully devised efficient ways of adapting
(See, for example, D.:1vid Granick, "Economic Develop
labor using technolor;ies.
ment and Productivity Analysis: The Case of Soviet Metalworking," _Q__uarterly
Journal of Economics, May, 1S57.) J.~nolic sector machine-paced labor intensity
is in evidence especially in road construction, housing and other public works
projects. For example, in India and Pakistan reinforced concrete is poured by
linking up a cement mi~~er with a long chain of ,;1orkers passing the cement from
hand to hand; it is put in place just before it is ready to cool and harden.
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post facto, i.e. long after the political decision to go forward ·oith a

project has been taken.
ject

Perhaps the choice of technology for a given pro-..

.

bundle is somm-1hat more "open," and shadm-, pricing should, in any

case, be pursued ,;-ihenever possible.

However, it must be recognized that

prestige and other institutional considerations play a perhaps even larger
role in the public than in the private sector.

Emphnsis on reducinz LDC

"technological dependence 11 on the rich countries, put alongside the
frequent protests against other forms of dependence, might help overcome
this tendency, while serving as a heal thy demonstration for the private
sector.

3.

A more realistic set o:.:: price signals, ,;,ihile thus an essential ingredient
of any improved use of technology on the part of the LDC's is, ho~-1ever, not
enough.

There do exist potential bottlenecks in the form of supervisory

and adaptive engineerin3 personnel, already referred to, ,,1hich inhibit the
fuller use of uns:dlled labor relative to capital--especially with rezard
to multiple shiftins and the introduction of new labor-using machine attach
ments.

The supervisory personnel problem seems to be capable of solution

through the eliciting of especially gifted individuals from the unskilled
in-plant labor ranks, usually after 6 to C months or a year.

With respect

to the appropriate kind of engineering skills, ho,Jever, both the Japanese
and the Taiwan cases already cited lead to the conclusion that special
indigenous trainin3 prosrams; possibly supported by the very companies
likely to benefit, should be encouraged.

Many plant officials expressed

the view that the ,-1ronz kind of experience or trc1ining often proved ,,1orse
than none in this regard.
4.

Closely related is the question of Research and Development.

We share the

view of Richard Nelson; i:iho; after careful consideration of the difficult
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issues involve d, finds "the argume nts in favor of buildin g up a strong
LDC basic researc h cap2::i ility unpers uasive.

111

Aside from the trial and

error costs which are in large part avoida ble--w ith mainly search costs
l
having to be incurre d by the LDC's- -there is the questio n of the critica
mass or minimum econom ies of scale involve d in the basic R&D produc tion
functio n in itself.

Yet it is interes ting to note that, in spite of the

ve
previou sly referre d to relativ ely lower LDC expend iture on R&D (relati
•
to GNP or budget ), the percen tage allocat ed to basic researc h is substan
tially greate r than in the advance d countr ies.

Since this is undoub tedly,

sity
in large part, due to the concen t:ration of R&D in governm ent and univer
their
institu tes which tends to a:i. low researc hers e}~cess ive freedom to set
own standar ds (freque ntly unduly imitati ve of their DC

11

frontie r 11 colleag ues),

encoura gement of industr y support ed applied researc h institu tes seems

warran ted.

Some such institu tes includi ng the Chung-h ua Electro nics

in India
Develop ment Corpor ation in Tai.wan and The Leathe::· Researc h Institu te

seem to have been quite success fol,

the Soviets dso h2ve appare ntly

some
realize d that researc h i.nsti tutes need to be drmm into doing at least

n
short-t erm applied wcrk for industr y-·· and compen sated for it in relatio
to result s--if they are not to become increas ingly irrelev ant.

2

In addi

ogy
tion, for specif ically defined industr y purpos es) e.g. adaptiv e technol

in
in footwe ar, electro nics or ~extile s, the sponso ring of interna tional
in
stitute s, along the lines of the f.nternn t:l.on.sl Rice Researc h Institu te

with
agricu lture, shoeld be carefu lly ccnsid ered--p referab ly in conjun ction
country - specifi c adaptiv e -researc h efforts .

Such institu tes could

111 Less Develop ed Countri es., Techno logy Transf er and Adapta tion, and the

Discus sion
Role of the Nation al Science Cornmunity,n Yale Econom ic Growth Center
Paper 104-, January 1971, p. 22c
211 Science Policy in the U.-S,S .. R,; OECD, 196'.;.

··39substan tially reduce the dangers of wastefu l duplica tion, with each LDC
exerting its own efforts at devising a cap:i.tal -stretch ing shoe technolo gy,
for examp 1 e.
5.

The establis hment of export processi ng zones, especia lly during a transi•
tional period en route to a mure generall y libez·ali zed economic policy
package , should be encourag ed and the necessar y overhead faciliti es and
customs arrangeme n·::~; provided by 6 overnme ntso

The attitude towards the role

of multi-na tionaJ. eor[:>ora tions ir, this conte:.g:t should he as pragmat ic as
possible .

There :Ls co:..i.side rable ::vidence that some foreign firms e~chibit

conside rable tech1:ol ogical flexibil it·1 , probably mor2 than domestfo public
or private ijrms~- at }.east at tite initial stages,.

On the other hand, most

such companie s also suffer fr::im 3ome of the strait-ja cketing associat ed
with fixed centrci. m2na3erri.ent :rules; e, go on c;lobal interes t rate and
1
e
break-ev en points-- even in such re.J.ativ ely enc m·Jment and technolo gy sensitiv

firms as Philips

and Volksi:-.1agen,.

Foreign subsidia ries;; especia lly if

admitted into a comforta bly pr<:,t.ectecl domestic r1artet, thus sometime s
e,{hibit inflexib ls beh2vio r on technolo gy, in addition to their collusiv e
market sharing, anti~ export and other

II

anti_,. socia:i. 11 behavio r.

Here again

ue have an argumenc for tackling the mac::o~·e conoraic environm ent as a prime
instrume nt

fo:i:

redud.ng some of the negacive , \vhile retainin g some of the

positive , effect, of mulU.ff nati~ma l c:.,rpon1 tion act.i.vity o

Just as with the

large- scale private dor.:estic firm., nuch of the so-cal led anti- social be

havior will d:u::appe ar under d,e p:resuirc of competi. tive forc:es in an export
substitu tion-ori ented e:.1vit'onn:ent,,
In addition ) of cou:.:·se,, LDC gov2:ri:1mcnts h2ve eve1:y right to regulate such
compani es' pra~tice s includin g thej_r ~ax.1 royalty, techni.ca l c1ssistan ce
payment s, the use of export pr,.1:.1.ib ition c:lauses; the t::,:aining of local
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managerial and supervisory personnel, as welJ possibly, the move from equity
control to

licensing arrangements over time.

U:ome of the features of the

Andean Group I s Treaty of Cartagena are relevant here.)

But while ,-m re

cognize that this issue is a highly charged one politically, LDC's shouid
also be aware that substantial benefits for technological flexibility,
including via the international division of labor by process) can flm·1 from
this form of, foreign capital.

Such companies do have a better opportunity

to scan resource endowments and markets on a global basis and to move
quickly and fle:;cibly to take advantage of this lmm1ledge.

It shoul9,

finally, be noted that, in contrast to the inflo-:•J of foreign public capital,
private investments may be less tied (at least legally) to specific countries
of origin and less likely to insist on financin:; only the import content of
projects--thus less prone to artificially

enhance

industrial sector import

and capital intensity.
6.

Few LDC' s nevertheless i'Jill want to rely too heavily on the foreign multi
national corporation for their capital and technology imports.

Increasing

participation by domestic firms of all sizes is therefore e political as
,:,:,ell as economic necessity,

Ever-y such firm clearly is not in a position

to be up-to-date on the international market conditions, resource endow
ments, and trade channels, including obtaininr; the necessary "illumination"
of the technology shelf and of technology assimilation possibilities tried
elsewhere.

LDC gcvernments should, therefore, consider taking on some of

the social search .snd information functions, perhaps through the establishment of specific industry-orient ed information service c~nters.
Turning, finally, to actions i1hich can be taken by the technology ex
porting, rich countries:
1.

There exists, it seems to us, a transcendental

and primary obligation on

the part of rich country airl donors, as well es the multilateral institutions,
to make discussion of the macro-economic policy setting, central to the

-41LDC technology issue, a central part of any discom~se between donor and
recipient,

This is not to say that aid should, or could, be conditioned

on any specific steps to be taken--bu.t it is to say that failure to discuss
the importance, the method and the timing for a transition to a more en
dowment and technology sensitive regime at the appropriate time may lJell
render all other \·1ell intentioned

11

direct actions 11 substantially null and

There is no shortage of awareness of the dimensions of the problem

void.

in most contemporary LDC's, nor a lack of awareness of the direction policy
must take if a continued conflict between grm·1th and employment cum income
distribution is to Le avoided.

Nevertheless, there exist strong political

as well as other obstacles to liberalization ,;.ii thin every import substituting
LDC.

On the one hand, large scale private industrial interests are loath to

loose their windfall profits, just as civil servants may be loath to let
the market displace some of their pov1er (and income); on the other, tech
nocrats may fear revenue and foreign exchange losses if tariffs ,.1ere to
be reformed and import control regimes liberalized.

·with respect to both

these obstacles, temporary Haid ballooning" can be help fol in the realm of
gentle persuasion as well as in making such transitions in policy package
practically feasible.
2.

Not only the, quanity but also the quality or composition of the aid package
is likely to be important in this context.

It is difficult to discuss the

distortions in favor of capital intensive technology when one's own, albeit
marginal, contribution to the total effort substantially contributes to the
same distortions.

i)e are referring here to the tlell-known effects of aid

tying, projects-only and minimum local-cost-fina ncing biases of many
donors.

Such pol:Lcies induce import and capital intensity and reduce the

scope for technolo,..;i.cd assimilation.

Program or sector loans, on the
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other hand, preferably untied and with minimum transaction requirement s
removed--es pecially if linked to changes in the LDC' s own policy environ
rnent--have a much better chance to help in the direction of letting the
"technologi cal chips" fall ·where they may, ·while permitting vital indi
1
It cannot be emphasized sufficiently
genous innovationa l juices to flow.
that rich country credibility in regard to the present mushrooming concern
with matters of technology choice, employment and income distribution will
depend in large part on the ability to put one's aid package where one's
mouth is.
3.

Hith respect to aided public sector projects, cost benefit analysis, using
shadow prices for capital and unskilled labor, es 1·1ell as possibly for
skilled and technical personnel, has a role to play--subje ct to the afore•
mentioned caveats on the actual use to which project analysis is usually
I
put--:md the perhaps more important caveat that salving one s conscience

..,

•.·,

by partial equilibrium attention to projects only could represent a case
of seriously misplaced concretenes s.

More attention, especially to the

technologic al choices ,,Ji thin projects; e.g. different- sized tractors and
different earth-movin g, e~tcavation and road-constr uction techniques is
indicated.

Even crude adjustments by the use of. shadow prices could be

very helpful in both project and technology selection.
l!-•

Efforts should be made to j_nfl uence the behavior of foreign private inves
tors in the same direction of technologic al fle}dbility .

For example, when

D.C. corporation s apply for investment guarantees, either of the multilateral or bilateral (e.g. OPIC) variety, evidence of the scope for decentralized subsidi2ry decision making on technolo 6y and output or process
1Project loans through financial intermediar ies can be used in much
the same way.

-43mix could become one of the criteria; at a minimum multi-national corpora
tions could be made increasingly sensitive to these issues in the course
0

s.

.

.

f t h e negotiatLOnS,

1

The success uf LDC efforts in broadening participation and softening any
existing conflict between output and employment cum distribution objectives
is intimately related to the strengti.1 of competitive forces domestically
as well as in the internatioual marketsn-thus forcin;=; entrepreneurs to
optimize, instead of merely satisficing.

An important dimension of the

extent to which this strategy is feasible, of course, has to do with the
extent of rich countries' readiness to accept the labor intensive goods
produced in this fashion.

Much can and remains to he done here, not only

in terms of the granting of temporary preferences (following the infant
industry argument) but also in -.:erms of a really effective rich country
adjustment assistance p":ogram 2t heme which would nip currently powerful
?

"sick industry" defensive reactions in the bud" -

Mo;:-eover, LDC' s should

be encouraged to look for non·,t:raditional trading partners, i.e. each
other, along with the non-traditional, i.e. labor intensive export substi
tutes.

At every SI'.;.'C level., whether in textiles, shoes or electronics, there

exist quality ranges in ·which some labor surplus LDC has a comparative
advantage over others; vigorous tr2.de an~onz vigorously growing LDC' s, as
they each restructure thei:,_· protected dor,:estic economy, need not be a
')

fanciful pipe-dream,J

Today LDC's carry out only 2 to 3 percent of total

1
To avoid criticism many such companies, for example, often resort to
higher- than•average (ernp1oyment~reducing) Woge poli~ies: -while their performance
on employment generation by resisting such pressures ana i.nnovating in labor
using directions mighi: lead to better p,ivate as well as social results •
... It might well be ,:'!rgued that 1 ' ai<l £unds 11 spent in this fashion, in re
turn for a reductior. of DC quotas and tariff oar.riers are in many ways superior,
in terms of both economic c:nd political effectiven-=s s, to aid funds spent abroad.
3
Regiona::. complerne:cttary trade; including by process, can be furthered by
the granting of reciprocal preferences., the harmonization of incentive programs
and tax policies., among others-•· as is currently being explo:ced in the context
of the South East Asian G.l1L or :?crd car.

world trade in manufactured goods, 35 percent of which takes place ·within the
group.

The scope for e:~pansion is large,

When all is said and done, the

potential of competitive trade opportunities may be more helpful than any
thing else in moving the LDC's to understandin3 the potential role of
technology transfers and
ment.

1

to undertaking the necessary changes in environ-

1

on

this point also see GrE,harn .Jones
in Developing Countr~, po 161.
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